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The Optimal Subsidy to Private Transfers 
Under Moral Hazard
RALPH CHAMI and CONNEL FULLENKAMP*
Private income transfers are increasingly viewed as an alternative to government
income transfers such as social insurance and foreign aid. This paper models the
incentive effects of government-subsidized private transfers and finds that
although there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers,
there is also a significant welfare cost. It is shown analytically, as well as through
simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers falls when the market
reaction is taken into consideration. [JEL D64, D82, H21]
R
ecently, governments have become more interested in using private,
nonmarket income transfers to supplement or substitute for government
income transfers. The motivations for this include fiscal necessity, the belief that
the private sector can allocate resources more efficiently than the government
sector, and the negative effects of government transfer programs on their recipi-
ents’ behavior.1 Although private nonmarket transfers are driven by individual
altruism, they can be manipulated by the government through the use of subsidies
and taxes. Such an approach may be a more cost-effective way for governments to
deliver social insurance, foreign aid, or debt relief, for example. 
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1See Kopits (1997) and Tanzi (2000).An essential question raised by this interest in private transfers is the size of
the optimal subsidy. There is an established argument in the economics literature
that private transfers ought to be subsidized because they give utility to both the
giver and the recipient of the transfer.2 But this analysis has not recognized that
nonmarket income transfers generally function as insurance against income risk.
Income risk is endogenous risk, in that the level of the risk a person or country
faces depends on the actions taken by the individual.3 A nation’s income risk, for
example, depends on the fiscal, monetary, and development policy actions chosen
by the government. Insurance provided in the presence of endogenous risk is
subject to moral hazard problems, which can be seen by tracing the effects of the
insurance through the affected market. This suggests that the optimal subsidy to
private nonmarket income transfers needs to take into consideration the market
reaction to the moral hazard problems created by the transfers.
In this paper, we calculate the optimal subsidy to private nonmarket income
transfers in the presence of endogenous risk. We develop a simple model of altru-
istic transfers subject to endogenous labor market risk and show that the optimal
subsidy depends on the degree of altruism of those making the transfers and the
strength of the market’s reaction to the moral hazard problem. It is possible, in the
presence of endogenous risk, that the optimal subsidy to private nonmarket
income transfers can be so low as to be negative—that is, to be a tax.
I. Model
We begin with an economy populated by two types of individuals: benefactors and
recipients. Benefactors are paired with recipients, toward whom they feel altru-
istic. That is, the recipient’s utility is an argument in the benefactor’s utility
function.4 Recipients’ utility is a function of only their own consumption and
effort. We assume that altruism is asymmetric only for the sake of clarity. Making
altruism reciprocal and symmetric will not change the qualitative results.5
We assume that the benefactor’s utility function is additively separable and is
given by:
where yb denotes the benefactor’s income, yr the recipient’s income, ur (yr) the
recipient’s utility, and 0 ≤β≤ 1 is the altruism factor. We assume that the utility
function u(.) is identical across agents, with ui′ > 0 and ui′′ < 0 for i = b,r.
Uyuy uy uy bbrr bb rr , () () () , ( ) =+ β
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2See Stiglitz (1987), Friedman (1988), and Kaplow (1995, 1998).
3See Kaplow (1989) and Chami (1996), in the context of insurance markets.
4Alternatively, we could view private transfers as motivated by the “warm glow” that giving imparts
to benefactors, as is discussed in Atkinson (1976) and Andreoni (1990). This specification places the
transfer itself in the benefactor’s utility function so that utility is given by Ub(yb,g). Doing so would not
alter any of the results. See Atkinson (1976, p. 15).
5See Bernheim and Stark (1988) and Stark (1993) for the argument that symmetric altruism does not
completely resolve conflicts between paired agents.We incorporate risk into the model by specifying the process that determines
the recipient’s income. Suppose that the recipients enter the labor market for a
single period and supply labor to firms. Output can be high (xH) or low (xL). The
probability that the low-output state occurs is P(e), where e denotes the worker’s
effort, which is unobservable to both the firm and the benefactor; we assume P′ <0
and P′′ > 0. Wages are yL in state L and yH in state H, where yL < yH. The differ-
ence in wages across states of nature reflects a moral hazard in the labor market.
Also, risk aversion on the part of recipients implies that yL > xL and yH < xH.
Competitive labor and output markets dictate that yL and yH will maximize
expected profits, while competition drives expected profits to zero. Hence,
(1)
The recipient’s expected utility is
where v(e) is a strictly convex function reflecting the recipient’s disutility of effort
and urL and urH are defined as above. The recipient chooses effort to maximize
utility. The first-order condition for the recipient is
(2)
which gives e* = e(yL, yH, g).
It is easy to show6 that ∂ e*/∂ yL < 0, while ∂ e*/∂ yH > 0. The impact of private
transfers on the optimal choice of effort by the recipient is
(3)
Equation (3) shows that the transfer essentially provides insurance against low
output, so the recipient reduces the effort he puts into avoiding the low-output
state. In other words, the recipient uses the income from the transfer to effectively
purchase a reduction in labor effort.7 This reflects the moral hazard problem
between the benefactor and the recipient.
The benefactor’s expected utility, EUb, is 
where  cb = yb – g is the benefactor’s net consumption, yb is her (exogenous)
income, and g is the transfer to her beneficiary (the recipient). The benefactor
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6Please refer to the appendix for details.
7Holtz-Eakin, Joulfian, and Rosen (1993) show, in an empirical study, that labor supply and labor
force participation drop as a result of large inheritances.decides how much to give to the recipient as a transfer.8 The first-order condition
for the private transfer decision is9
and, using the envelope condition to substitute out condition (2), the above condition
reduces to
(4)
which yields g* = g(yb, yL, yH; e*, β ). It is straightforward to show that higher
altruism leads to higher transfers, g*
β ≡∂ g*/∂β > 0, and that higher wages in either
state lead to lower transfers:
g*
L ≡∂ g*/∂ yL < 0, and g*
H ≡∂ g*/∂ yH <0 . 10
We now move to the market reaction to private transfers. We have shown that
greater altruism on the part of givers (benefactors) leads to larger transfers,
reduced labor effort, and a higher probability of realizing the low-output state,
which implies lower expected profits for firms. Since expected profits are lower,
firms must reduce costs by lowering expected wages. But they must also adjust the
relationship between the high wage and low wage in order to motivate the recipi-
ents to put forth greater effort. Given that the expected wage must be lower, we
focus our analysis on wage dispersion. In other words, given e*, g*, and the condi-
tions already derived, we examine the impact of increases in β on yH/yL.
To analyze the impact of altruism on wage dispersion, we differentiate the
zero-profit condition with respect to β :
where, as we have shown previously, ∂ e*/∂ g < 0 while ∂ g*/∂β > 0. Since risk aver-
sion on the part of the recipient implies that yL > xL and yH < xH, an increase in β
moves the state-contingent wages yL and yH further apart. Thus, greater altruism
results in lower expected wages and greater wage dispersion. The givers’altruism
toward the recipients exacerbates the moral hazard problem that already exists
between recipients and firms. In other words, private transfers impose a negative
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8Our specification assumes that transfers are chosen and distributed before any other outcomes are realized.
Delaying the choice and distribution of transfers until after other outcomes are realized strengthens our results
by inducing the Samaritan’s dilemma. See Buchanan (1975), Bruce and Waldman (1990), and Chami (1996).
9Alternatively, we could choose to make the transfer state-contingent, so that it is gL in the low-output
state and gH in the high-output state. Doing so does not affect any of the qualitative results presented below.
See, for example, Chami (1998).
10Please refer to the appendix for details.The market responds to the negative externality in private transfers by
increasing the dispersion between the high wage and the low wage. This creates
an increase in the recipient’s market income risk, which is inefficient. 
A social planner would take the change in risk allocation into consideration
when choosing the socially optimal transfer. Assume that the social planner
chooses g, yL, and yH in order to maximize the social objective function 
subject to e argmax E(Ur) according to (2) and (yL, yH) argmax π , according to (1).
First, consider the planner’s choice of transfer. Differentiating the social
planner’s objective function with respect to the transfer yields11
(5)
where 
It is easy to prove that the social planner chooses a smaller transfer in this




the optimal transfer that the social planner chooses when risk is exogenous and g*
sp
is the optimal subsidy when risk is endogenous. 
This result is driven by the market’s response to the introduction of endoge-
nous risk and the accompanying negative externality. The social planner takes into
account the market reaction to the negative externality caused by private transfers,
which is the depressive effect of transfers on yL. This reaction to the negative
externality at least partially offsets the positive externality embodied in the double
counting of recipient utility in the social planner’s objective function. Thus the
optimal transfer is reduced.
The question raised by this result is how much the welfare effects of the nega-
tive externality offset the double-counting effect. Which effect dominates? In
order to answer this question, we compare the optimal subsidies from the exoge-
nous risk and endogenous risk models. Suppose that transfers are subsidized at
rate s, where the subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax that is taken as given by
individuals, as in Kaplow (1995, 1998). This reduces the benefactor’s cost of
making a transfer of size g to (1– s)g. The optimal subsidy is the one that would
induce the benefactor to behave like the social planner with respect to the choice
of private transfers. The first-order condition in this case is 
(6) − ′ − ( ) + ′ = us u br 10 β .
∂
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11See Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) for a similar treatment in the insurance market.
12See Chami and Fullenkamp (2000) for a complete discussion of the exogenous risk case.The subsidy that would induce the benefactor to behave like the social planner
is one that would make the benefactor’s first-order condition (6) equivalent to the
social planner’s first-order condition,
Solving for this s under exogenous uncertainty yields13
Now we derive the optimal subsidy in the endogenous risk case. First, we
rewrite the social planner’s first-order condition (5) using the envelope condition
to substitute out condition (2). Doing so gives 
(7)
We know that owing to the moral hazard in the labor market, the recipient is not fully
insured, so that urH > urL and (1– P)u′rH < Pu′rL. We also know that ∂ y*L / ∂ g <0 .
The benefactor’s first-order condition for subsidized private transfers is
Solving for the optimal subsidy using (7) yields
(8)
Note that the optimal subsidy in the endogenous risk case has two terms. The
first term, 1/(1+β ), which is positive, is equal to the subsidy from the exogenous
risk case. The additional term, which is negative, represents the market response
to the negative externality. As β increases, the first term decreases and the second
term becomes more negative. The interaction of altruism and the response of the
market to private transfers will determine whether the optimal subsidy is positive,
zero, or negative (a tax).14 The higher the level of altruism, and the stronger the
market response to private transfers, the lower the subsidy will be.
II. Calibration and Policy Implications
A useful way to demonstrate the effect of endogenous risk on optimal private trans-
fers is to perform a simple calibration exercise that calculates the size of the
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13This is also the optimal subsidy under certainty. See Kaplow (1995).
14Alternatively, using a social welfare function of the form ub +EUr alters the result, in that the
subsidy unambiguously becomes a tax.subsidy in equation (8) as a function of the altruism parameter β , for varying
choices of the market response to private transfers, ∂ y*
L/∂ g. Each line in the figure
corresponds to a progressively higher magnitude of ∂ y*
L/∂ g, beginning with the
certainty or exogenous risk case of ∂ y*
L/∂ g = 0, which corresponds to the subsidy
calculated by Kaplow (1995). The remaining parameters P and u′r /u′b are held
constant over all calculations.15
Figure 1 demonstrates the response of the optimal subsidy to the presence of
endogenous risk. As the market response to private transfers increases, representing a
greater presence of endogenous risk, the optimal subsidy falls further below the
benchmark. The market response in the figure varies from 0 to –1.25, with a value of
–1.0 indicating that, at the margin, the market reduces the wage in the bad state by
Ralph Chami and Connel Fullenkamp
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15These parameters were calculated as follows. The probability of realizing a bad output state was
calculated as the average time the United States spent in recession relative to time it spent in expansion
during 1945–96, using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s business cycle dates. This number,
about 
1/6, represents the probability that any given month will be a recessionary month. The ratio of
marginal utilities was calculated using the constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function
u(c)=c1–γ/(1–γ) with the risk-aversion parameter γ set equal to four. This value corresponds to esti-
mates in the finance literature and represents a moderate level of risk aversion. The marginal utility of the
recipient was calculated assuming a consumption level equal to the twentieth percentile of annual U.S.
household income ($14,768), while the marginal utility of the benefactor was calculated assuming a
consumption level equal to the median annual U.S. household income ($35,492). These statistics are from
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Altruism level (β )
Subsidy rate
Figure 1. Optimal Gift Subsidy as Altruism and Market Reaction to Gift Giving Varyone dollar for every dollar of transfer made. The figure shows that the subsidy func-
tion is bounded away from zero for all values of β as long as the market response to
transfers stays between 0 and –0.5. For sufficiently high values of β and ∂ y*
L/∂ g,
however, the optimal subsidy does become a tax. Generally speaking, it seems that it
would require a very strong market response and a very high degree of altruism for
the subsidy to become a tax.16 But the optimal subsidy including the market response
does decline significantly, relative to the subsidy that ignores the market response.
III. Conclusion
In this paper, we have calculated an optimal subsidy to private nonmarket income
transfers in the presence of endogenous risk, and we have shown through simula-
tion that the presence of endogenous risk can dramatically lower the optimal
subsidy, relative to the case in which endogenous risk is ignored. This result has
important implications for those governments who wish to subsidize private
income transfers in order to supplement or replace government income-transfer
programs. Subsidy rates should take the market’s reaction to private income trans-
fers into consideration. This means that careful measurement of the market reac-
tion to private transfers should be an essential part of choosing the subsidy rate.
APPENDIX
This appendix derives and signs the partial derivatives governing the responses of effort and
transfers mentioned in the text.
Effort
From the first-order condition for the recipient, equation (2), we obtain:
Private Transfers
To find the derivatives of private transfers with respect to altruism and wages, we first find and
sign the denominator of the partial derivatives. Writing out the second-order condition for the
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16Large gifts from parents to children (more than $10,000 per year) are taxed in the United States.
Perhaps this is a special case in which the altruism level is high enough, and the market response great
enough, to justify such a tax.Rearranging terms, we have
Note that all the terms except the one in braces are negative. Thus, a sufficient condition for the
concavity of the benefactor’s surplus function is 
Assumption 1: where i = 1, 2.
The above assumption implies that a sufficient condition for an interior solution to the bene-
factor’s problem is that the beneficiary be sufficiently risk averse, such that the direct impact of
a change in his wealth on his marginal utility of income, in the bad state, exceeds the indirect
impact of wealth on the probability of a low output occurring through its effect on the benefi-
ciary’s effort. 
To sign the derivative of g* with respect to β , differentiate the first-order condition for the
benefactor (4):
Similarly, for the derivative of g* with respect to yH, we have 
Finally, for the derivative of g* with respect to yL, we have, using the above concavity
assumption,
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